Abstract: This paper examines how one aspect of earnings quality -discretionary accruals -affects subsequent capital investment pattern and efficiency. We find that, conditional on investment opportunities, investment in fixed assets in period t is less sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. We also find that, at a given level of capital investment in fixed assets in period t, the return on assets in period t +1 is lower for firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. The overall evidence suggests that firms with large positive discretionary accruals misallocate resources, and thus, impose dead-weight efficiency loss.
Introduction
Despite its fundamental importance, little empirical research investigates how earnings quality affects capital investment decisions with the notable exception of Biddle and Hilary (2006) . They find that investment is more sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with lower accrual quality as defined in Dechow and Dichev (2002) , for which the external cost of capital is higher (e.g., Francis et al., 2005) . This paper examines how another aspect of earnings quality -discretionary accruals -affects capital investment pattern and efficiency in the subsequent period. This paper is motivated by the mixed evidence on the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals. On one hand, firms with large unsigned discretionary accruals, both positive and negative, have a higher external cost of capital (e.g., Francis et al., 2005) . On the other hand, firms with large positive discretionary accruals have a lower stock return in the future, suggesting that firms with large positive discretionary accruals have a lower external cost of capital at the time of portfolio formation (e.g., Xie, 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Defond and Park, 2001) . A higher external cost of capital implies that firms with large positive discretionary accruals have a stronger incentive to avoid external financing. Thus, capital investment is expected to be more sensitive to the availability of internally generated cash flows. However, a lower cost of capital implies that firms with large positive discretionary accruals are able to raise external capital at a relatively low cost. Thus, capital investment is expected to be less sensitive to internally generated cash flows.
Using the data from 1988 to 2005, we find that, conditional on investment opportunities, capital investment in fixed assets in period t is less sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. We also find that, at a given level of capital investment in period t, firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 have a lower return on assets in period t+1. As accounting performance following investment decisions is expected to be worse if a firm misallocates resources, the result is consistent with the interpretation that firms with large positive discretionary accruals misallocate resources to fixed assets in the subsequent period.
The higher market valuation for firms with large positive discretionary accruals at the time of portfolio formation is either due to investors' information processing bias (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) or due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000) . To assess the validity of those two alternative explanations, we examine whether the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is related to external financing in period t. We find that, given the level of discretionary accruals, the stock return in period t is lower for firms that raise more external financing in period t, suggesting that the market valuation of discretionary accruals is largely due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives.
The findings in this paper suggest that firms with large positive discretionary accruals misallocate resources, and thus, impose dead-weight efficiency loss.
The findings have important implications for three strands of literature. First, a negative association between earnings quality and cost of capital is usually interpreted as evidence that lower earnings quality increases the information asymmetry component of cost of capital (e.g., Francis et al., 2004) . However, our findings suggests an alternative channel to explain the negative association: firms with lower earnings quality make less efficient investment decisions, which, in turn, adversely impacts future cash flows. Second, in combination with Biddle and Hilary (2006) , our findings suggest that a general statement about earnings quality and future investment patterns is not valid unless a specific attribute of earnings quality is specified. This is because the capital market prices different attributes of earnings quality differently. Finally, our findings indicate that the higher market valuation for firms with large positive discretionary accruals at the time of portfolio formation is largely due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives.
The paper is organized as the following. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 describes variable measurement and research design. Section 5 presents the main empirical results on the association between discretionary accruals and future investment pattern and efficiency. Section 6 presents the robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. Related literature

Literature on firm investment
Neoclassical model of investment predicts that a firm will invest up to a level where the marginal cost of investing is equal to managerial assessment of the marginal profitability of capital (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Mussa, 1977) . Thus, firm investment should only increase with its underlying investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q (e.g., Tobin, 1969) . However, the misalignment of managerial and shareholders incentives (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) and asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outside investors (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984) could cause investment to vary with internal cash flows. Under the agency view, managers over-invest to reap private benefits such as "perks", large empire and entrenchment. Because external capital market disciplines managers from pursuing selfinterested investment, an influx of internal cash flows enables managers to invest more.
Under asymmetric information, managers in the interest of existing shareholders restrict themselves from costly external financing, and thus investment is expected to increase with internal cash flows.
A substantial body of empirical studies provides evidence consistent with that corporate investment increases with internal cash flows (e.g., Blanchard, Lopez-de- Silanes and Shleifer, 1994) . Furthermore, starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) , a few studies find that firm investment is more sensitive to internal cash flows for firms which are a priori classified as more financially constrained (e.g., Hoshi et al, 1991; Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited, 1995) . Based on the argument that managers are more likely to forego positive NPV projects when firms are more financially constrained, Biddle and Hilary (2006) interpret a higher sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows as evidence of lower investment efficiency. Some recent papers, however, have questioned the usefulness of the sensitivity of investment to cash flows in assessing the effect of market frictions (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and Cleary, 1999) . Given the controversy on the sensitivity of investment to cash flows as a measure of investment efficiency, we use accounting performance following investment decisions to gauge the efficiency of investment decisions in the latter analysis.
All the above studies share the common assumption that the capital market is efficient with respect to either disciplining managers or incorporating all available information. Another strand of literature investigates whether inefficient capital markets affect corporate investment decisions. These studies use either time-series or crosssectional approach to examine whether non-fundamental noise in market valuation impacts investment decisions (e.g., Barro, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Blanchard, Rhee and Summers, 1993; Chrinko and Schaller, 2001; Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Polk and Sapienza, 2006) .
The empirical evidence from time-series approach, however, is rather mixed. On one hand, Blanchard et al. (1993) uses the time-series economy-wide data in the U.S. and concludes that stock market valuation appears to play a limited role, given fundamentals, in the determination of investment decisions. On the other hand, Chirinko and Schaller (2001) uses economy-wide data in Japan and concludes that, given structural assumption about the fundamental and non-fundamental components of stock valuation, the market bubble has a significant effect on investment in fixed assets. Baker et al. (2003) find that stock valuation is relevant for contemporaneous investment decisions for equity-dependent firms. Polk and Sapienza (2006) find that managers cater to investor sentiment by investing more (less) when market valuation is above (below) fundamentals, suggesting that non-fundamental noise in stock valuation is relevant for investment decisions. While related, this paper, nevertheless, differs with those two papers in two important aspects. First, this paper is based on the explicit premise that market valuation is endogenous to earnings quality, while those papers assumes that market valuation is exogenous. Thus, we examine the impact of large positive discretionary accruals on subsequent investment decisions. Second, in contrast to the level of investment, we are interested in the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows.
Literature on market valuation of discretionary accruals
Empirical evidence on the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is mixed. On one hand, Francis at al. (2005) finds that firms with large unsigned discretionary accruals, both positive and negative, have a higher cost of capital in the long run. On the other hand, starting with Sloan (1996) , voluminous studies document that, conditional on the level of cash flows, firms with large positive discretionary accruals have a lower stock return in the future, suggesting that those firms have a lower cost of capital than otherwise similar firms at the time of portfolio formation (e.g., Xie,
2001
; Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Defond and Park, 2001 ).
1
Broadly speaking, there are two alternative theories to explain why firms with large positive discretionary accruals have a higher market price at the time of portfolio formation. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that it is due to investors' information processing bias, while Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that it is due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives. We are a priori uncertain about the validity of those two theories, and thus, use a setting where investors are likely certain about managerial reporting incentives to test the two explanations.
1 The reversal of stock prices for firms with large positive discretionary accruals is consistent with many explanations, such as investors' naïve fixation on reported earnings, trading frictions, survival bias, risk estimation, and agency theory of overvalued equity (e.g., Khan, 2008; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2006; Kraft, Leone and Wasley, 2006 and Kothari et al., 2006) .
Other related studies
This paper is related to Fairfield et al. (2003) and Zhang (2007) , which document that firms with higher accruals tend to be growth firm, and thus, invest more in the future.
Their results are limited to the level of capital investment and are not interested in the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows. Our results are robust while explicitly controlling for investment opportunities and correcting measurement error in Tobin's Q.
This paper is also related to "real" earnings management literature. Stein (1989) develops a model in which, faced with short-term market pressure, managers may forsake good investments, such as cut R&D and advertising spending, to boost contemporaneous earnings. Evidence in Bushee (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) supports such conjecture. Our paper differs in that we investigate the impact of earnings quality on subsequent investment decisions.
Finally, this paper is related to Kothari, Louskina and Nikolaev (2006) . They document an unusually high level of capital expenditure prior to and during the year of high discretionary accruals. Their results are not mutually exclusive from our results.
While their focus is on investment leading up to the formation of discretionary accruals portfolio, our focus is on investment following the formation period.
III. Hypothesis development
Prior studies provided mixed evidence on the market pricing of discretionary accruals, especially large positive discretionary accruals. Francis et al. (2005) Finally, we examine whether the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is related to subsequent external financing. We choose subsequent external financing because of two reasons. First, the two alternative theories yield different predictions on the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals when investors are aware of the associated reporting incentives. Second, prior studies find that firms have large positive discretionary accruals prior to equity issuances (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a and 1998b) .
If the pricing of discretionary accruals in the period of portfolio formation is due to investors' information processing bias, the valuation of discretionary accruals in period t-1 is not expected to change with the status of external financing. However, if it is due to investors' uncertainty about the managerial reporting incentives, upon news of external financing transactions, investors realize the reporting incentives for large positive discretionary accruals and the valuation of discretionary accruals is adjusted accordingly.
We are a priori uncertain about which theory explains the market pricing of discretionary accruals better. This leads to the third hypothesis stated in the null:
The market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is unrelated with the amount of external financing in the subsequent period.
IV. Measurement and Research Design
Measure of discretionary accruals
Controlling for profitability is important in examining investment decisions. One measure that controls for profitability is the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals measure in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . We calculate discretionary accruals from the following model, following Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) :
where CA it is current accruals for firm i in year t, ΔSales it (Compustat item Δ12) is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, and ΔAR it (Compustat item Δ151) is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t. Current accruals is the change in noncash current assets minus the change in current operating liabilities (Compustat item Δ(4-1) -Δ(5-34-71)). Variables are scaled by total assets in period t-1 (Compustat item 6).
The regression residual ε it captures the unexpected change in working capitals for firm i in year t given the change in cash sales.
Next we assign each firm to a portfolio based industry membership and return on assets. 2 Portfolios are constructed by matching firms into return on asset (ROA) quartiles and industry membership, where ROA is net income (Compustat item 172) deflated by beginning book value of assets (Compustat item 6). The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual for firm i in year t (DA it ) is the firm-year residual ε it less the mean residual for the corresponding portfolio excluding firm i.
Finally, we partition firms into deciles based on the magnitude of performanceadjusted discretionary accruals (DA it ). We identify firms in the top decile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as firms with large positive discretionary accruals. The indicator variable MAX_DA it is coded as 1 if firm i is in the top decile of performance-adjusted discretional accruals in period t and 0 otherwise.
Research design on future investment patterns
In order to assess whether subsequent capital investment for firms with large positive discretionary accruals is different from other firms, we use the following model:
We explicitly model capital investment in fixed assets in period t as a function of investment opportunities at the beginning of the period (Q it-1 ) and internal cash flows (CASH it-1 ) at the beginning of the period. We use Q and CASH at the beginning of the period because the bulk of investment decisions are made at the beginning of the period rather than at the end of period. scaled by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6) at the beginning of period t.
The interaction term β 5 between MAX_DA it-1 and CASH it-1 is the variable of interest. A negative (positive) coefficient on the interaction is consistent with the interpretation that capital investment is less (more) sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large positive discretionary accruals. However, if Tobin's Q, as a proxy of investment opportunities, contains more measurement error for firms with large positive discretionary accruals, it can also result in a higher sensitivity of investment to internal cash for those firms because internal cash flow also reflects information about investment opportunities (e.g., Poterba, 1988) . Erickson and Whited (2000) suggest the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation yields measurement-error-consistent results. To control for potential measurement errors in Tobin's Q as a proxy for investment opportunities, we use GMM to estimate the model. Finally, we use firm-fixed effect model to assess whether the time-series variation in discretionary accruals has an impact on time-series variation in subsequent capital investment.
Research design on future investment efficiency
If a firm misallocates resources to fixed assets, accounting performance following investment decisions is expected to be worse than firms that allocate resources properly to fixed assets. We use the accounting performance following investment decisions to gauge the efficiency of investment decisions for firms with large positive discretionary accruals. More specifically, we use the following model: 
Market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals and external financing
We use the following model to examine whether the market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is related to external financing in the subsequent period:
The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return in period t (BHAR it ). The explanatory variables include discretionary accruals in period t-1, internal cash flows in period t-1, external financing in period t (XFIN it ) and the interaction between discretionary accruals in period t-1 and external financing in period t. External financing (XFIN it ) includes both the debt issued and equity raised for a particular year. We include external financing in period t as a main effect because prior studies suggest that the capital market reacts to news of external financing activities. However, in this context, the variable of interest is the interaction between and DA it-1 and XFIN it.
An insignificant interaction suggests that the pricing of discretionary accruals is unrelated to external financing in period t. A significant negative interaction, however, suggests that the pricing of discretionary accruals is related to external financing, which is consistent with the interpretation that the pricing of discretionary accruals in the period of portfolio formation is largely due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives.
V. Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
The final sample to test the first (second) hypothesis consists of 60,728 (58,306) (1998a, 1998b) , those firms invest less in fixed assets in period t. On a univariate basis, firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 have a lower return on assets in period t+1.
Empirical results on investment pattern and efficiency
Panel A of is virtually identical to the results from the OLS estimation. Column 4 adds firm-fixed effect and obtains virtually identical results as those without firm-fixed effect, suggesting a possibility of over-identification. As the results are similar using different estimation methods, we only report the GMM results for the remainder of the paper. The empirical evidence in Table 3 indicates that investment is less sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large positive discretionary accruals. Figure 1 presents the results in a graphical manner. We partition the sample into two groups: firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 versus other firms. We sort firm-year observations into 50 portfolios based on the value of internal cash flows in period t-1 within each group. Then we plot the mean value of INVESTMENT t and CASH t-1. It is obvious that firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 have a flatter slope, i.e., a lower sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the correlation among all variables to test efficiency of investment decisions. Consistent with prior studies, firms with higher accruals and profitability in period t have a higher return on assets in period t+1. Consistent with the reversal of discretionary accruals, firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t have a lower return on assets in period t+1. Table 4 reports the results on efficiency of investment decisions. The baseline model includes accruals and internal cash flows in period t. We observe a positive coefficient on internal cash flows and a negative coefficient for accruals, which suggest that, given the same profitability, firms with higher accruals have a lower return on assets in the future. In the second column, the coefficient on investment level in period t is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.207 and p-value = 0.001). Column 3 reports the result on the efficiency of investment decisions. The negative main effect on MAX_DA t-1 is consistent with the reversal of discretionary accruals in the future. The variable of interest, the coefficient on the interaction between MAX_DA t-1 and INVESTMENT t , is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.046 and p-value = 0.068). As accounting performance following investment decisions is expected to be worse if a firm misallocates resources, the negative coefficient is consistent with the interpretation that firms with large positive discretionary accruals misallocate resources to fixed assets. Figure 2 presents the results in a graphical manner. We partition the sample into two groups: firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 versus other firms. We sort firm-year observations into 50 portfolios based on the value of investment in period t within each group. Then we plot the mean value of INVESTMENT t and ROA t+1. It is obvious that, given the same level of investment, return on assets in period t+1 is consistently lower for firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. Table 5 presents the results on whether market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals is related to subsequent external financing. The coefficient on the interaction between DA t-1 and XFIN t is significantly negative (coefficient = -1.565 and pvalue = 0.011). The negative coefficient indicates that, given the same level of discretionary accruals in period t-1, the size-adjusted stock return in period t is significantly lower for firms that raise more external capital in period t. The evidence is consistent with the interpretation that market pricing of discretionary accruals in the period of portfolio formation is largely due to investors' uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives.
Market pricing of large positive discretionary accruals in period t
VI. Robustness Checks
Large positive discretionary accruals and external financing
A lower cost of capital implies that, ceteris paribus, firms with large positive discretionary accruals also raise more external capital in period t, which is consistent with prior findings in Teoh et al. (1998) . Although retained earnings, internal financing, rather than equity issuance are by far the largest source of funds for capital investment (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Mayer and Sussman, 2003) , it is necessary to assess the extent to which our main results are driven by the association between large positive discretionary accruals and subsequent external financing. First, we explicitly control for external financing in period t and its interactions with Q t-1 and CASH t-1 . Second, we examine whether firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 and negative external financing in period t also have a lower sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows. controlling for the level of external financing. The coefficient on the interaction is -0.040 (0.001) after controlling for both the level of external financing and its interactions with investment opportunities and internal cash flows. Per Table 6 Panel A Column 3, firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 and negative external financing in period t also have a lower sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows, as evident in the statistically negative coefficient on the interaction between MAX_DA t-1 and CASH t-1 .
The overall evidence suggests that our main empirical results are not solely driven by the association between large positive discretionary accruals and more external financing in the next period.
Characteristics for firms with large positive discretionary accruals
Although we document that our results is not solely driven by the association between large positive discretionary accruals and external financing in period t, other managerial reporting incentives also lead to large positive discretionary accruals. For example, Kothari et al. (2006) suggest that firms that are overvalued in the past have incentives to manage earnings upward to prolong the overvaluation. Managers have incentives to use positive discretionary accruals to avoid debt covenant violation constraints (e.g., Defond and Jimbalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994 Kothari et al. (2006) , we use the buy-and-hold size-adjusted return from period t-4 to in period t-1 (BHAR t-4,t-1 ) as the proxy for prior overvaluation.
Buy-and-hold size adjusted return is raw return for the period minus the raw return for the matching decile from CRSP database. We also include its interaction terms with investment opportunity (Q t-1 ) and internal cash flow (CASH t-1 ). Second, we use the leverage in period t-1 as the proxy for the potential cost of violating debt covenants. A higher cost of violating debt covenants implies a stronger incentive to use positive discretionary accruals to avoid debt covenant violation.
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. We also include its interaction terms with investment opportunity (Q t-1 ) and internal cash flow (CASH t-1 ). Table 6 Panel B Column 2 reports the result on the investment-cash flow sensitivity test after controlling for LEVERAGE t-1 . The interaction between MAX_DA t-1 and CASH t-1 is still negative and statistically significant (coefficient = -0.021 and p-value = 0.005).
Third, to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by managerial incentives to profit from trading in period t, we include CEO's realized net purchase of the company's stock in period t (CEOBUY t ) as a proxy for CEO's intention to trade in period t. We also include its interaction terms with investment opportunity (Q t-1 ) and internal cash flow Finally, we include all those variables and their interaction terms in the model. Per Table 6 Panel B Column 4, the coefficient on the interaction between MAX_DA t-1 and CASH t-1 is -0.040 and statistically significant (p-value = 0.001). Overall, our main results are robust to managerial incentives to report large positive discretionary accruals.
Measurement issue in the proxy for internal cash flows
Following prior literature, we measure internal cash flow (CASH) as net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation. However, Bushman, Smith and Zhang (2005) notice that this measure of internal cash flows can be disaggregated into cash flows from operations (CFOs) and non-cash accounting components. To avoid making erroneous inferences on the sensitivity of investment to cash flows, we also use cash flow from operations (CFOs) as an alternative measure of internal cash flows. The empirical results are presented in Table 6 Panel C and are largely consistent with the main results.
For example, the coefficient on the interaction between MAX_DA t-1 and CFO t-1 is -0.071 with a p-value of 0.001.
Discretionary accruals in period t
Polk and Sapienza (2006) document a positive association between discretionary accruals and contemporaneous level of investment in fixed assets. As large discretionary accruals in period t-1 reverse in period t, we examine the robustness of our results after controlling for discretionary accruals in period t (DA t ). Table 6 Panel D reports the results. After controlling for discretionary accruals in period t, investment in fixed assets is still less sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large discretionary accruals in period t-1 (coefficient = -0.019, p-value = 0.013). Interestingly, in contrast to the positive association documented in Polk and Sapienza (2006) , the main effect on contemporaneous discretionary accruals is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.035 and p-value = 0.001) after controlling for large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. We also include the interaction terms of discretionary accruals in period t with investment opportunity (Q t-1 ) and internal cash flow (CASH t-1 ), and the results are similar.
VII. Conclusions
This paper investigates how one aspect of earnings quality -discretionary accruals -impacts future investment pattern and efficiency. We find that, conditional on investment opportunities, investment in fixed assets in period t is less sensitive to internal cash flows for firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1. We also find that, at a given level of capital investment in period t, firms with large positive discretionary accruals in period t-1 have a lower return on assets in period t+1. As accounting performance following investment decisions is expected to be worse if a firm misallocates resources, the result is consistent with the interpretation that firms with large positive discretionary accruals misallocate resources to fixed assets, thus imposes deadweight efficiency loss.
One of the potential areas for future research is to identify the specific channel ( (Compustat item 128) deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34-71)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firmspecific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms (excluding the sample firm itself) matched on Fama-French 48 industry classifications and current return on assets quartiles. MAX_DA is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 25*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Internally generated cash flows (CASH) is measured as the income before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) plus depreciation and amortization expenses (Compustat item 14) scaled by beginningof-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). External finance (XFIN) is the sum of net cash inflows from the equity issuances (Compustat item 108-115-127), net cash inflows from the long-term debt issuances (Compustat item 111-114) and cash flows from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). ROA is measured as net income (Compustat item 172) deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). ACCRUALS is measured as the difference between earnings (Compustat item 172) and cash flows from operating activities (Compustat item 308). Numbers in the parenthesis are p-value of t-statistics for mean test and z-statistics for median test 
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Industry dummies Included
Year dummies Included
Adjusted R**2 24.70% N 57,862 
